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THE FUTURE OF DEVILS LAKE:
IS JUSTICE DELAYED JUSTICE DENIED?
I. INTRODUCTION
The ownership of the expanding bed of Devils Lake in Devils Lake,
North Dakota, is still uncertain despite an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling in Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota' on August 17, 2001.2 This note
will discuss the ongoing controversy between the State of North Dakota and
the Spirit Lake Tribe (Tribe), formerly known as the Devils Lake Sioux
Tribe.3 The controversy surrounding Devils Lake began when the Sioux
signed a treaty with the United States government in 1867.4 Ultimately, the
question is whether the State of North Dakota obtained title to the bed of
Devils Lake upon its entry into statehood under the "equal footing" doctrine
or whether the lakebed is held in trust for the Tribe by the United States.5
The "equal footing" doctrine declares that "new states admitted to the Un-
ion since the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the origi-
nal states in tide waters and in the lands below the high water mark." 6
This note will discuss the history of Devils Lake and its relationship to
the Spirit Lake Tribe, the United States government, and the State of North
Dakota. The scope of this note will include federal law7 regarding the own-
ership of lakes and riverbeds,8 traditional rights given to the Native Ameri-
can population in the United States,9 and a history of the relationship
between the Spirit Lake Tribe and the United States government.10 This
note will attempt to uncover, taking into consideration constitutional and
1. 262 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 750.
3. See generally Devils Lake Sioux Tribe v. North Dakota (Devils Lake 1), 714 F. Supp.
1019 (D.N.D. 1989) (discussing the history of the relationship between the Devils Lake
Tribe and the United States government).
4. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 735-36.
5. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1021.
6. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
7. The applicable federal law includes the United States Constitution, the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), and the Quiet Title Act of 1972, 28
U.S.C. § 2409a (2000).
8. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845) (stating that the shores of naviga-
ble waters are reserved to the states).
9. See United States v. Idaho (Idaho 1), 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097-99 (D. Idaho 1998).
10. See Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 735-37 (8th Cit. 2001).
(discussing the litigation between the Spirit Lake Tribe and the United States government).
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property rights issues,"1 whether the litigation over Devils Lake will con-
tinue; and if so, who will hold the title to the lakebed of the fastest-growing
body of water in North Dakota. 12
This note will begin by defining the "equal footing" doctrine and trac-
ing its history within federal law. The definition of navigability and a dis-
cussion of states' rights under the Property Clause of the United States
Constitution (Property Clause) and as created by Congress will be included
in this section. Part II will discuss the issue of "equal footing" in light of
the recent holding in Idaho v. United States (Idaho III),13 and how this deci-
sion could affect the outcome of any future litigation regarding Devils Lake.
Part III will focus on the history of Devils Lake, the litigation leading up to
Spirit Lake Tribe, and an analysis of Spirit Lake Tribe. The final section of
this note will cover possibilities of future litigation initiated by, or on behalf
of, the Spirit Lake Tribe against the State of North Dakota and will make a
prediction as to the results of such litigation.
II. THE "EQUAL FOOTING" DOCTRINE
It was by right of discovery that England took possession of America.14
Because America was discovered by subjects of the King of England and
taken in his name, all lands became vested in the King. 15 When the thirteen
colonies freed themselves from England, all the rights of the Crown and the
English Parliament were vested in the existing states, subject only to the
rights of the federal government established by the United States Constitu-
tion. 16 The laws of the newly formed United States were not very different
from those established by the English Crown.17 The United States of
America retained all the rights of the former English government and also
adopted many of England's laws and doctrines. 18
11. See generally In re Matter of the Ownership of the Bed of Devils Lake, 423 N.W.2d
141 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the rights of riparian landowners to the bed of Devils Lake).
12. Statement of North Dakota Governor Ed Schafer Presented by David A. Sprynczynatyk,
State Engineer to the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee Relative to the Devils
Lake Emergency Outlet (Oct. 23, 1997) available at http://www.senate.gov/-epw/105th/ sprylO-
2.htm. Devils Lake rose twenty feet between 1993 and 1997, which made it the most serious and
pressing flooding problem in North Dakota. Id.
13. 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
14. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1894),
15. Id.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id.
18. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-96 (1987). As sovereign




The laws in the United States on the subject of ownership of land were
the same as the common law of England, except as modified by the United
States Constitution, state constitutions, or statutes. 19 As the King of Eng-
land had, the federal government of the United States held sovereign title to
all lands underlying navigable waters. 20 This was an essential aspect of
sovereignty because the owner of submerged lands controlled fishing, navi-
gation, and all other water-related uses.21 Because the use of such waters
was vitally important to many commercial activities, the title to the land
was vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the people. 22
The United States held submerged lands "in trust" for territories to ac-
quire upon passage into statehood.23 However, "[wihenever the United
States shall have fully executed these trusts, the municipal sovereignty of
the new states will be complete, throughout their respective borders, and
they, and the original states, will be upon an equal footing, in all respects
whatever." 24 Pollard v. Hagan25 established what is now called the "equal
footing" doctrine with the above quoted language.26 Under this doctrine, all
states entering the Union after the adoption of the Constitution have the
same rights to navigable waters and land thereunder within their borders as
the original states had when they entered the Union.27 In conclusion, the
"rule laid down in Pollard[]. .. has been followed in an unbroken line of
cases which make it clear that the title thus acquired by the State is absolute
so far as any federal principal of land titles is concerned." 28
A. NAVIGABILITY: THE DETERMINING FACTOR OF TITLE
It is undisputed that the federal government held sovereign title to the
lakebeds of all navigable bodies of water.29 Additionally, the federal gov-
19. Shively, 152 U.S. at 14.
20. Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 196.
21. Id. at 195.
22. Id. at 196.
23. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845). For example, when Alabama
entered the United States, it gained all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain
possessed by the original colonies. Id.
24. Id.
25. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
26. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224.
27. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894). After the American Revolution, each
state became sovereign and in that capacity held absolute right to navigable waters and the land
underneath them for common use. Id.
28. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977).
29, See Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1449 (D. Idaho 1992).
The thirteen colonies claimed lands under navigable waters as successors to the English Crown.
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987).
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emnment could retain the right to control, develop, and use the waters for its
own purposes, whether the underlying land is owned by the state or by the
riparian landowner.30 However, because title to lands underlying non-
navigable bodies of water is vested in the riparian landowner, the definition
of navigability has often been a source of conflict.31
Certain bodies of water are considered navigable even though they
would not have been considered navigable in England because their waters
do not ebb and flow. 32 In Harrison v. Fite,33 the court defined navigability
as occurring in a watercourse that is
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or ... a capacity for
valuable floatage in the transportation to market of the products of
the country through which it runs. It should be of practical useful-
ness to the public as a public highway in its natural state and with-
out the aid of artificial means. 34
Evidence of navigability is not conclusive because bodies of water that may
have been considered navigable at one time may change course over time
and become non-navigable. 35 In most states, including North Dakota, a
"preponderance" of the evidence is required to prove the navigability of a
body of water.3
6
To summarize, a body of water is considered navigable if it may be
used for travel and commerce. 37 In most jurisdictions, a "preponderance"
of the evidence is necessary to prove that a river or lake is navigable. 38 The
rights that the federal government has in determining ownership of naviga-
ble lakes and rivers are set forth by the Property Clause. 39
30. Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 202. Riparian means that the land borders a river,
stream, or other body of water. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (7th ed. 1999).
31. See State v. Brace, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332 (N.D. 1949); North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ.
& Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussing the conflict over the navi-
gability of the Little Missouri River when North Dakota became a state).
32. See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (defining navigability in fact, as
bodies of water that are used or "susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as high-
ways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes
of trade and travel on water"). Bodies of water such as lakes and rivers that did not have a tide
were not considered navigable in England. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876).
33. 148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906).
34. Harrison, 148 F. at 783-84.
35. Id. at 784.
36. See North Dakota, ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands v. United States, 972 F.2d 235,
238 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that the State had to prove navigability by a preponderance of the evi-
dence); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 731 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (stating
that a preponderance of the evidence is the standard used by most courts).
37. Harrison, 148 F. at 783-84.
38. Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 731.
39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). The
Property Clause permits federal regulation of federal lands. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138.
[VOL. 78:355
2002]
B. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POWER
TO RESERVE WATER RIGHTS IN NAVIGABLE BODIES OF WATER
The United States Constitution grants Congress the "Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitu-
tion shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States,
or of any particular state." 40 This clause of the Constitution, known as the
Property Clause, grants the federal government the power to reserve the
water rights of navigable bodies of water.41 This power may be exercised
over Indian reservations and other federal lands.4 2
The federal government can defeat the "equal footing" doctrine by
conveying land to a private party prior to a territory's entry into statehood.
43
In other words, a state will not gain the rights to the bed of a navigable lake
or river if the United States granted title to another entity prior to the state's
entry into the Union.44 However, the federal government's power to con-
vey land to a private party may only be exercised when there is an interna-
tional duty or public exigency.45 A public exigency has been defined to
include three situations: "(1) performance of international obligations; (2)
improvement of commerce, or (3) 'carrying out other public purposes ap-
propriate to the objects for which the territory was held."'46 Because there
is a strong presumption that the United States holds land under navigable
waters for the eventual benefit of future states, a conveyance of these lands
must also pass a two-part test.4 7 First, it must be shown that Congress
clearly intended to include the lands beneath navigable waters in the con-
veyance. 48 Second, it must be shown that Congress clearly meant to defeat
the future state's claim to the underlying land.4 9
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
41. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138.
42. Id.; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554 (1981) (stating that reserva-
tions are federal lands set aside for continued occupation by aboriginal peoples).
43. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197 (1987). Under the Consti-
tution, the federal government may make grants to parties prior to statehood for a public purpose,
thus defeating a state's right to lands under navigable waters. Id.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926).
46. Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Port of Tacoma, 525 F. Supp. 65, 69 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(quoting Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55).
47. See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55 (stating that disposals made by the United States
should not be inferred unless the intention was explicitly stated); see also Utah Div. of State
Lands, 482 U.S. at 202 (stating that the Court would not infer an intent to defeat a state's right to
land under navigable waters from the act of reservation alone).
48. Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 201-02.
49. Id.
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Accordingly, a court will not infer a pre-statehood conveyance of title
to a lakebed by the United States "'unless the intention was definitely de-
clared or otherwise made very plain,' or was rendered 'in clear and especial
words,' or 'unless the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the
waters of the stream."' 50 For example, in Utah Division of State Lands v.
United States,S1 the Court held that because there was not enough evidence
indicating that the federal government intended to include the lakebed in the
federal reservation, Congress could not defeat Utah's title to land under its
navigable waters.52 Because express intent is required to defeat a state's ti-
tle to submerged lands, intent to include lands under navigable bodies of
water in a reservation will not be inferred merely because the body of water
was within the boundaries of the reservation. 53
To conclude, states are granted title to lands under navigable waters
within their territory upon entry into statehood under the "equal footing"
doctrine unless the United States government has previously given title to
another party for performing of an international obligation, improving
commerce, or carrying out a public purpose related to the land.5 4 The
"equal footing" doctrine remains the controlling law regarding acquisition
of land by states upon entering the United States. 55 In 1953, the Submerged
Lands Act was adopted in order to detail the rights of the states under the
"equal footing" doctrine.56
50. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55; and Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)).
51. 482 U.S. 193 (1987).
52. Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 202. The State of Utah brought suit against the
federal government, asserting that it owned title to the bed of Utah Lake under the equal footing
doctrine. Id. at 193. The Court held that Utah owned title to the lakebed because there was insuf-
ficient evidence of Congress's intent to reserve the lakebed for the federal government, to ratify
the agreement giving the land to the federal government, and to defeat Utah's claim to the title of
the lakebed. Id. at 208.
53. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 554 (stating that absent an express reference regarding the
body of water, the lake or river will not be assumed to be included in a reservation of land even if
the lake or river lies within the boundaries set forth in the treaty).
54. See Pullayup Tribe of Indians v. Port of Tacoma, 525 F. Supp. 65, 69 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(stating the three situations that constitute a public exigency).
55. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 318 (1973) (stating that the Submerged
Lands Act did not alter the "equal footing" doctrine, but it merely confirmed the rights of the
states), overruled by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
371 (1977). Corvallis overruled Bonelli by holding that "as of the time of [a state's] admission to
the Union, the force of [the equal footing] doctrine was spent; it did not operate after that date to
determine what effect on titles the movement of the river might have." Corvallis Sand & Gravel,
429 U.S. at 371.
56. Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 318; see also Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. at 372
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C. THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT: DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF THE
STATES IN FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, 57 which did not
alter the "equal footing" doctrine, but merely reiterated that states have pre-
existing property rights within their borders. 58 Section 1301 of the Act de-
fines "lands beneath navigable waters" as
lands within the boundaries of each of the respective States which
are covered by nontidal waters that were navigable under the laws
of the United States at the time such State became a member of the
Union, or acquired sovereignty over such lands and water thereaf-
ter, up to the ordinary high water mark as heretofore or hereafter
modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction. 59
Under § 1311, not only are the states' titles and ownership confirmed and
established in regards to the lands beneath navigable waters within their
borders, but the United States also releases its rights to all "lands, im-
provements, and natural resources," except as otherwise reserved. 60 Section
1313 sets forth some exceptions to the Submerged Lands Act, including
"lands expressly retained by or ceded to the United States when the State
entered the Union" and "such lands beneath navigable waters held, or any
interest in which is held by the United States for the future benefit of any
tribe, band, or group of Indians or for individual Indians."6 1 In effect, the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, served to "reaffirm the title of the states to
lands beneath navigable waters at statehood."62
In order for a private party to obtain title to submerged lands, the title
must have passed to the party prior to the state's entry into statehood, and it
must pass the requirements of the Submerged Lands Act and the "equal
57. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
58. See Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 318 (stating that the passage of the Act only added to
the existing law).
59. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999). Accretion is defined as the "gradual accumula-
tion of land by natural forces, [especially] as alluvium is added to land situated on the bank of a
river or on the seashore." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 20 (7th ed. 1999). Erosion is defined as
the "wearing away of something by action of the elements, [especially] the gradual eating away of
soil by the operation of currents or tides." Id. at 562. Reliction is defined as the "process by
which a river or stream shifts its location, causing the recession of water from its bank." Id. at
1293.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1) (1994).
61. Id. § 1313.
62. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 275 (8th Cir.
1982).
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footing" doctrine. 63 For example, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho (Tribe)
brought suit against the State of Idaho arguing that the bed and banks of
Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River were reserved for the benefit of
the Tribe. 64 However, Idaho argued that it owned title to the lake and river-
bed based on the "equal footing" doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act of
1953.65
III. IDAHO V. UNITED STATES: IS A SIMILAR OUTCOME FOR THE
SPIRIT LAKE TRIBE POSSIBLE?
In United States v. Idaho (Idaho I),66 the United States brought an ac-
tion against Idaho on behalf of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho (Tribe) in
its capacity as the Tribe's trustee.67 The Tribe sought to establish title to the
submerged lands under Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River, which it
claimed were included in its reservation.68 The issue was whether the Ex-
ecutive Order given by President Andrew Johnson that established the res-
ervation for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe included title of Lake Coeur d'Alene
and the St. Joe River.69
In 1873, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent representatives to the
Coeur d'Alene area to induce tribes, including the Coeur d'Alene Tribe it-
self, to settle down on reservations instead of continuing their migratory life
style.70 As a result, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe was given not only all the land
it had previously received by the 1867 treaty,71 but also an area that in-
cluded the St. Joe River, the Coeur d'Alene River, and Lake Coeur
d'Alene.72 President Andrew Johnson described the same area of land that
had been articulated in the agreement between the Tribe and the commis-
sion in his Executive Order with the objective of preventing the land's
63. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 318 (1973) (stating that title to lands
beneath navigable waters passes to states upon statehood under the equal footing doctrine and that
the Submerged Lands Act confirms states' pre-existing title in islands, lakes, and riverbeds).
64. United States v. Idaho (Idaho 1), 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (D. Idaho 1998).
65. Id.
66. 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Idaho 1998).
67. Idaho I, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
68. Id. at 1097.
69. Id. at 1095. An executive order is "[a]n order [or regulation] issued by or on behalf of
the President, [usually] intended to direct or instruct the actions of executive agencies or govern-
ment officials, or to set policies for the executive branch to follow." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
591 (7th ed. 1999). An executive order must be ratified by Congress to be valid. Idaho 1, 95 F.
Supp. 2d at 1096.
70. Idaho 1, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
71. Id. at 1095 (stating that the reservation included an area southwest of Lake Coeur
d'Alene, known as Hangman's Valley).
72. Id. at 1095-96.
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sale. 73 The Executive Order stated, "[ilt is hereby ordered that the follow-
ing tract of country in the Territory of Idaho be, and the same is hereby,
withdrawn from sale and set apart as the reservation for the Coeur d'Alene
Indians in said Territory." 4 The Coeur d'Alene Tribe argued that this Ex-
ecutive Order set "apart the reservation [and] also reserved for the benefit of
the Tribe the bed and banks of the Lake and other navigable waterways ly-
ing within the outer boundaries of the reservation." 75
According to the Property Clause, Congress has the power to distribute
submerged lands to private parties for several reasons, including a public
exigency. 76 In Montana v. United States,77 the Court held that the reserva-
tion of lands for Native American tribes is a public exigency; therefore, this
question was not at issue in Idaho 1.78 Instead, the issue was whether the
federal government actually reserved the lands in question.79 The court in
Idaho I used the test set forth in United States v. Alaska8O to determine
whether the submerged lands were included in the Executive Order.81 The
test considers: (1) whether the President's actions showed a clear intent to
include the lake or riverbed in the reservation, (2) whether the President's
Executive Order was ratified by Congress, and (3) whether in that ratifica-
tion, Congress intended to defeat the state's title to the submerged lands.82
In order to answer the questions of the test, the court considered the relevant
documents on their faces, the proximity of the submerged lands to the ac-
tual reservation, and the reservation's purpose.83
The Ninth Circuit developed a test to determine the intent of executive
orders that formed Indian reservations.84 First, it must be shown that there
was actually a navigable body of water within the borders of the reserva-
73. Id. at 1096. The Executive Order's purpose was to create a reservation for the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe. Id. at 1095. The reservation's exact boundaries were not established until 1873.
Id.
74. Id. at 1097.
75. Id.
76. See id. (discussing the Property Clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981).
77. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
78. Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
79. Idaho 1, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (D. Idaho 1998). In 1887, the Tribe ceded all right,
title, and claim to all the lands it owned to the United States, except for the land given to them in
the reservation. Id. at 1096.
80. 521 U.S. 1 (1997).
81. Idaho 1, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
82. Id. (citing Alaska, 521 U.S. at 38-40).
83. Id.
84. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada Enter., Ltd., 713 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir.
1983).
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tion.85 Second, the tribe must have needed the navigable body of water.86
Third, the government must have been aware of this necessity when it re-
served the land to the tribe.87 In Idaho I, the parties agreed that the first
element was satisfied.88 The court held that the second element was satis-
fied because the evidence showed that in 1873 the Tribe depended on the
river and the lake as a significant part of everyday life. 89 The court also
found that the Tribe depended on the lake not only for its plant life, animal
life, and transportation, but also for its cultural life.90 The third requirement
was met, according to the court, because the federal government was clearly
aware of the Tribe's dependence on the submerged lands at the time of the
Executive Order.91
Idaho argued that even if the Executive Order had established Con-
gress's intent to convey title of the submerged lands to the Tribe, the Order
was not ratified until after Idaho became a state in 1891.92 Therefore, since
Idaho entered the Union on an equal footing with the other states, all sub-
merged lands should have been conveyed to Idaho.93 However, the Idaho
Constitution contained a clause that disclaimed any rights to lands within
Idaho that were already owned by Indians or Indian Tribes.94 Based on this
clause and the fact that Congress, the Senate, and the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs were all aware that the reservation included the submerged
lands within its boundaries, the court held that Congress had demonstrated a
clear intent to defeat Idaho's title to the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene.95
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Idaho 1, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (D. Idaho 1998).
88. Id. at 1100.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1101. The Tribe depended on the lakes and rivers as a source of fish, waterfowl,
and plant materials; as a way to facilitate the harvest of large mammals; as a means of transporta-
tion; and as an important part of its religious and social life. Id.
91. Id. at 1102. Prior to 1867, the Tribe sent several petitions to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs requesting charters to certain lands within the future reservation, making the federal gov-
ernment aware of the Tribe's desire to possess the land. Id. at 1103.
92. Id. at 1114.
93. Id. at 1113 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1894)).
94. Id. at 1114. The Idaho State Constitution disclaimed
all right and title to unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries [of
Idaho], and to all lands lying within [Idaho] owned or held by any Indians or Indian
Tribes; and until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands
shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United
States.




After the trial court's decision, the case was appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the decision of the lower court was affirmed. 96 Certiorari to the
Supreme Court was granted following the circuit court's affirmation. 97 In-
Idaho v. United States (Idaho III),98 the Court looked specifically at "Con-
gress's declarations and intent [in order to] resolve conflicts over sub-
merged lands claimed to have been reserved or conveyed by the United
States before statehood."99 The Court analyzed this question under the
strong presumption that all submerged lands were held in trust for a future
state.100
Although Congress had not ratified the Executive Order of President
Johnson at the time Idaho became a state, it did ratify the 1887 and 1889
agreements several months later, both of which included language stating
that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe would hold title to its reservation forever.101
As a result of the passage of the agreements, the Court held that Idaho's
stance was contrary to the congressional intent demonstrated prior to the
passage of the Idaho Statehood Act because the agreement included lan-
guage stating that "the Coeur d'Alene Reservation shall be held forever as
Indian land." 102
According to the Court, Idaho's stance conflicted with Congress's on
the status of the submerged lands.103 The Court implied Congress's intent
based on the fact that there was no evidence that the land in question had
passed to Idaho before the ratification of the 1887 and 1889 agreements,
and because Congress compensated the Tribe for a portion of the reserva-
tion that included the submerged lands.104 The fact that the lakebed was in-
cluded in the reservation was confirmed, according to the Court, when an
act of Congress ceded a portion of the reservation in order to build the town
of Harrison. 105 If the land had already passed to the state, the land cession
would have been beyond the power of Congress. 106 Based on this analysis,
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. 107
96. United States v. Idaho (Idaho II), 210 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000).
97. Id., cert. granted, 531 U.S. 1050 (2000).
98. 533 U.S. 262 (2000).
99. Idaho 11I, 533 U.S. at 273 (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 36 (1997)).
100. Id. at 272-73.
101. Id. at 279.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 279-80.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 281.
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The decision in Idaho III opened the door to similar situations requir-
ing interpretation of congressional intent, such as Spirit Lake Tribe.'0 8 Like
the Coeur d' Alene Tribe, the Spirit Lake Tribe claims that the United
States government holds the bed of Devils Lake in trust for it.109 The con-
flict turns on the interpretation of a treaty between the United States and the
Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux Tribes of North Dakota."10 The Spirit Lake
Tribe claims that the border of the reservation includes the entire lake,
whereas North Dakota contends that the lake is outside of the reservation's
boundaries and was sold to the United States as part of the treaty. I
IV. DEVILS LAKE: WHO OWNS THE LAKEBED?
A. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE CURRENT STATUS OF DEVILS LAKE
Devils Lake is located in northeastern North Dakota and is one of the
largest freshwater lakes in the state.1 2 It supports boating, fishing, and
countless other recreational activities."l3 Devils Lake is also the center of
an ongoing controversy between the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe, now known
as the Spirit Lake Tribe (Tribe), and the State of North Dakota.114 Although
the issue addressed in this note focuses on the conflict involving the Tribe,
other controversies also surround Devils Lake and the ownership of its
lakebed because of its recent growth.115 Therefore, any decision regarding
the ownership of Devils Lake could have a substantial impact in North Da-
kota and elsewhere. 116
108. See id. at 279-80 (stating that Congress knew that the submerged lands were to be in-
cluded in the reservation); see also Spirit Lake Tribe v. United States, 262 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir.
2001).
109. Devils Lake !, 714 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D.N.D. 1989).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1020-21.
112. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 735.
113. Craig Bihrle, Deciphering Sovereign Lands, ND OUTDOORS, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 20; see
also Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 750 n.7 (Bright, J., dissenting).
114. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1020. Devils Lake is adjacent to the reservation of the
Spirit Lake Tribe. Id. The Tribe claims that Devils Lake is part of its reservation and that the
United States holds the title to the lakebed in trust for the Tribe. Id.
115. See In re Ownership of the Bed of Devils Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141, 145 (N.D. 1988)
(holding that riparian and littoral landowners owned the land adjacent to Devils Lake down to the
ordinary high water mark); see also 101 Ranch v. United States, 905 F.2d 180, 182-83 (8th Cir.
1990) (stating that Devils Lake is navigable in fact and that the ordinary high water mark moves
with the fluctuating elevation of the lake).
116. See Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 750 n.7 (Bright, J., dissenting) (stating that judicial
notice should be taken of the fact that ownership of the lakebed was not significant until recently
because of the rising level of the lake and its increasing importance for recreational use).
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A body of water must be navigable in order to become property of a
state upon its admission to statehood because title of non-navigable bodies
of water is not vested in the states.117 In North Dakota, a body of water
must be defined as navigable in fact, which includes use for "pleasure, pub-
lic convenience, and enjoyment ... as well as purposes of trade.""18 Ac-
cording to 101 Ranch v. United States,19 Devils Lake is a navigable body
of water, and North Dakota obtained title to its lakebed under the equal
footing doctrine in 1889 when North Dakota became a state.120 Contrary to
the Eighth Circuit's dicta in 101 Ranch, the Tribe claims that the United
States holds title to the bed of Devils Lake in trust for the Tribe.121
B. DEVLS LAKE Sioux TRIBE V. NORTH DAKOTA
The Spirit Lake Tribe contests the conveyance of Devils Lake to North
Dakota based on the rationale that Devils Lake is part of its reservation and
was given to the Tribe to fulfill a public exigency prior to North Dakota's
entry into statehood. 22 In 1977, the Tribe brought its suit against the State
of North Dakota and all parties that claimed an interest in the bed of Devils
Lake, including the United States government.123 The Devils Lake Sioux
Tribe claimed that it was entitled to possession of the lakebed because
Devils Lake was part of its reservation as established by the Treaty of Feb-
ruary 19, 1867,124 and was held in trust for the Tribe by the United
States.125 The treaty provided for a cession of lands from the Tribe to the
United States, which allowed the government to make improvements such
as roads, railroads, and telegraph lines upon the land; in return, a reserva-
117. See State v. Brace, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332 (N.D. 1949). Title to lands underlying non-
navigable waters is vested in the federal government or to persons who own title. Id.
118. Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (N.D. 1921).
119. 905 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1990).
120. 101 Ranch, 905 F.2d at 182. In 101 Ranch, the partnership's property, which was lo-
cated adjacent to West Bay of Devils Lake, became part of the lakebed due to submergence. Id. at
182-83. Although it owned title to the land through a 1949 quitclaim deed, the partnership only
received such rights as it was entitled to as a riparian landowner, Id. at 185. Therefore, its title
was subject to the fluctuation of the water level of Devils Lake. Id.
121. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D.N.D. 1989).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Native American Treaty between the United States of America, Sisseton, and Wahpeton
Bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, Feb. 19, 1867, 15 Stat. 505 [hereinafter Native American
Treaty]. This treaty was made between the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Dakota Sioux Indi-
ans and the United States; it provided for an Indian cession of land to allow the United States to
build public improvements. Id. at 506-07. It also provided the land for the Spirit Lake Reserva-
tion. Id.
125. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1020.
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tion was set aside for the Tribe. 2 6 Article IV of the treaty described the
boundaries of the reservation as
[b]eginning at the most easterly point of Devils [L]ake; thence
along the waters of said lake to the most westerly point of the
same; thence on a direct line to the nearest point on the Cheyenne
[R]iver; thence down said river to a point opposite the lower end
of Aspen [I]sland, and thence on a direct line to the place of be-
ginning. 2 7
The Tribe argued that the wording of the treaty implied that Devils Lake
was included in the reservation because the reservation included the lake's
northern boundary.l2 8 However, North Dakota contended that it took title
to the lakebed upon its entry into the Union under the "equal footing" doc-
trine.129
In 1951, the Tribe was a party in another action that was brought before
the Indian Claims Commission. 130 In Lower Sioux Indian Community In
Minnesota v. United States,131 the Commission held that the United States
government owed the Tribe fair market value of the land that the Tribe gave
to the United States in the 1867 treaty. 132 The Commission stated that
"Ilthe area in suit" did not include the Devils Lake reservation because it
had been previously set aside as part of the 1867 treaty. 133 Therefore, the
Tribe contended that it retained ownership of Devils Lake because it was
not given to the United States government as part of the treaty. 1
34
In Devils Lake Sioux Tribe v. North Dakota (Devils Lake /),135 the
Tribe claimed that "Devils Lake was explicitly excluded from the case."1 36
126. Id.
127. Native American Treaty, supra note 124, at art. IV.
128. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1020. The Devils Lake reservation borders the southern
end of Devils Lake. Id. If the treaty is construed to create the reservation along the northern
boundary of Devils Lake, then the lake would be included in the reservation. Id.
129. Id. at 1021.
130. Lower Sioux Indian Cmty. In Minn. v. United States, 36 Ind. Cl. Comm. 472, 472
(1975); Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1021. Congress established the Indian Claims Commission
in 1946. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1021. Until it was terminated in 1978, the Commission
heard claims of all tribes "arising out of treaties with the United States." Id. Prior to this Com-
mission, tribes were allowed to assert that the federal government had allowed the loss of Indian
land because the government had not engaged in "fair and honorable dealings." Martinez v. Kerr-
Mcgee Corp., 898 P.2d 1256, 1258 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
131. 36 Ind. Cl. Comm. 472 (1975).
132. Lower Sioux Indian Cmity., 36 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 496.
133. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1022.
134. Devils Lake Sioux Tribe v. North Dakota (Devils Lake 11), 917 F.2d 1049, 1052 (8th
Cir. 1990) (discussing United States v. Lower Sioux Indian Cmty. In Minn., 519 F.2d 1378 (Ct.
Cl. 1975)).
135. 714 F. Supp. 1019 (D.N.D. 1989).
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In other words, Devils Lake was not included in the land cession given to
the United States, but was part of the reservation. 37 However, the United
States argued that the bed of Devils Lake was included in the Tribe's com-
pensation for the land previously taken, and therefore, the Tribe had no
claim to the lakebed.138 This argument was based on the Commission's de-
scription of the land in controversy as "[t]he area in suit." 139 The "area" re-
ferred to what was one of a compilation of maps by Charles Royce of land
ceded from the Indians to the United States, which were known as "Royce
areas."' 140 In the proceedings of Lower Sioux Indian Community, the part of
the land cession described as Royce Area 538 included Devils Lake.141 The
court in Devils Lake I stated that the government did not initially include
the land under Devils Lake when it considered how much to pay the Tribe
for the land cession. 142 However, because it was compensated for the lake-
bed in 1977, the Tribe had no claim. 143 Therefore, summary judgment was
granted in favor of North Dakota. 144
Later, the Tribe appealed the district court's decision claiming that
there was a material factual dispute regarding an agreement made to settle
the Tribe's claim on its aboriginal title. 4 5 The Tribe argued that the settle-
ment offer did not refer to the Royce maps, but it merely followed the land
description in the 1867 treaty, which did not include Devils Lake.146 The
court in Devils Lake Sioux Tribe v. North Dakota, (Devils Lake 11)147 ad-
mitted that the Royce maps appeared to include Devils Lake in the land ces-
sion.148 However, the court addressed several inconsistencies that raised a
material factual dispute.149 Although the bed of Devils Lake was assumed
to have passed to the state upon entry into the Union, the Department of the
Interior issued an opinion concluding that Devils Lake was held in trust for
136. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1022. This claim was based on dicta from Lower Sioux




140. Charles C. Royce, Indian Land Cessions in the United States, THE EIGHTEENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE BUREAU OF AM. ETHNOLOGY, 1896-1897, at 561- 964 (1899).
141. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. at 1023.
142. Id. at 1024.
143. Id. at 1026.
144. Id.
145. Devils Lake H, 917 F.2d 1049, 1050 (8th Cir. 1990). In 1977, the United States agreed
to pay the Tribe $1.50 per acre of land that it took from the Tribe. Id. at 1053.
146. Id. at 1051-52.
147. 917 F.2d 1049 (8th Cir. 1990).
148. Devils Lake 1I, 917 F.2d at 1052.
149. Id. at 1052-53.
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the Tribe because it was entirely within the reservation's boundaries.150
The court found it significant that the 1977 agreement regarding the land
cession was settled soon after the Department of the Interior stated that the
United States held the lakebed in trust for the Tribe.151 Also, in the settle-
ment agreement, the reservation's boundaries were described according to
the terms in the Treaty of February 19, 1867.152 Because the description
was described inconsistently in the treaty and by the Royce maps, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary judg-
ment for the defendants.153
The court determined that there were disputes regarding the 1977
agreement, and therefore, a summary judgment motion could not be up-
held.154 The court, however, made no determination as to the merits of
other issues asserted by North Dakota.155 Therefore, the Tribe was free to
bring another lawsuit in federal court. 156
C. SPIRIT LAKE Sioux TRIBE V. NORTH DAKOTA
In 1998, after several years of attempted settlements between the Dev-
ils Lake Sioux Tribe, now known as the Spirit Lake Tribe, and the State of
North Dakota, the Tribe revived its previous claim initiated in Devils Lake
11, which reversed the summary judgment decision in Devils Lake 1.157
1. Holding: The Tribe's Claim is Time-barred Based on the
Quiet Title Act
In Spirit Lake Tribe, the court held that the Tribe's claim against the
federal government was time-barred under the Quiet Title Act of 1972
(QTA).158 As a result of this holding, the court dismissed the federal gov-
150. Id. Although the United States Attorney General assumed that Devils Lake was given
to North Dakota when it became a state, the Department of the Interior issued a conflicting state-
ment which concluded that "Devils Lake is not adjacent to the Fort Totten [Devils Lake] Sioux
Indian Reservation but wholly within its boundaries and the United States holds title to the lake-
bed in trust for the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe." Id.
151. Id. at 1054.
152. Id. at 1056. The Tribe ceded all of its land to the United States, except for the land set
aside in the Lake Traverse Reservation and the Devils Lake Reservation. Id. at 1051.
153. Id. at 1056-57.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1057.
156. Id.
157. Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2001).
158. Id. at 737; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2000). The Quiet Title Act states that the
"United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate
a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security
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ernment from the litigation and then determined that the government was an
indispensable party to the proceedings.159 Therefore, the court had to dis-
miss the entire action according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 160
According to the QTA, the statute of limitations runs for twelve years
from the date that a party knew or should have known of an adverse party's
claim on title.161 On July 7, 1971, the federal government obtained a large
portion of Devils Lake from North Dakota to help with the Garrison Diver-
sion Project.162 Because the project "was the single most important, visible
public works project in North Dakota in the last half of the [Twentieth]
Century," the court found that the Tribe must have known of the project and
the government's land acquisition.163 If the Tribe did not actually know of
the land transfer, the court held that it should have known. 64 Because the
Tribe did not file a complaint until 1986, fifteen years after the government
made its initial claim on the lakebed, the court determined that the Tribe's
action was time-barred. 165
The Tribe claimed that even if it knew or should have known of the
government's claim in 1971, the government abandoned its claim in the ti-
tle of the lakebed in 1976.166 According to the QTA, "[i]f the government
clearly and unequivocally abandons its interest, a district court loses juris-
diction over a pending QTA action."167 According to the Tribe, the Associ-
ate Solicitor for the Division of Indian Affairs, Reid Peyton Chambers,68
issued a memorandum in 1976 that stated Devils Lake was within the
boundaries of the Devils Lake Reservation, and therefore, held in trust for
interest or water rights." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). However, it is not necessary that the govern-
ment's claim on the title be "clear and unambiguous." Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 738.
159. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 748.
160. Id. at 737. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state "if a person ... hereof cannot be
made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
as indispensable." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g).
162. See Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 738 (stating that the purpose of the project was to
"divert water from the Missouri River to irrigate arid lands, and stock municipal water supplies, in
central and eastern North Dakota").
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 739 (stating that the Tribe would have had to file its claim by 1983 in order
"to preserve the government's waiver of sovereign immunity"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g).
166. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 739.
167. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(e).
168. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 748 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe.169 The Tribe believed that this opinion extin-
guished the government's claim on the lakebed.170
However, under the Property Clause, congressional authorization is
needed for the government to abandon property.171 Because Chambers was
a "subordinate officer," he lacked the congressional authorization required
to extinguish the government's claim of title.172 Based on this assertion, the
government contended that it never acted consistently with Chamber's
opinion. 173
The court in Spirit Lake Tribe determined that summary judgment was
an inappropriate action by the district court in Devils Lake I.174 Instead, the
court held that the district court should have dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction because a district court does not have the power or authority to
hear a time-barred QTA suit. 175 As a result, the court in Spirit Lake Tribe
vacated the judgment in part and remanded the matter "so that the court
may properly dismiss the claims against the government for lack of juris-
diction."176
2. Judge Bright's Dissent: Has Justice Been Denied?
Judge Bright wrote a dissenting opinion in which he stated that "the
Tribe did not know and would not know of the government's adverse claim
until 1981, when the official position of the United States changed from its
view that the Tribe owned the lakebed to a view of 'no definite position' on
the title to the lakebed."177 According to Judge Bright, the conveyance of
the lakebed by North Dakota in 1971 was only to allow the implementation
of the Garrison Diversion Project.178 The conveyance included whatever
interest North Dakota had in the lakebed at the time, but North Dakota's ti-
tle to the lakebed was never confirmed. 179
The Department of the Interior suggested, in a 1981 letter to the Land
and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice regarding an
inquiry into the state's title of West Bay of Devils Lake, that it was not nec-
169. Id. at 740.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Warren v. United States, 234 F.3d 1331, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 742.
174. Id. at 745.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 748 (Bright, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 749.
179. Id. The Department of the Interior stated that it was not necessary to decide who owned
the entire bed of Devils Lake until such issues arose in litigation. Id.
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essary to address the title to the lakebed.180 Justice Bright suggested it was
wrong to determine that the Tribe knew or should have known of the United
States' claim on the lakebed in 1971 since the government "did not know,
nor had it determined, ownership of the lakebed."181
Additionally, he stated "it is well-documented that the Tribe histori-
cally relied on the federal government to manage day-to-day Reservation
affairs, and the Tribe had a right to think that the government was not
cheating it out of the ownership of the lakebed, but would protect the
Tribe's interests." 182 Because the district court did not determine the own-
ership of the bed of Devils Lake, the court failed to provide the Tribe with
its day in court. 183 According to Justice Bright, this denied justice to the
Tribe because "[j]ustice delayed is justice denied."184 Because summary
judgment was not issued on the merits of the case, another lawsuit may
arise, because "the title dispute remains unresolved." 185
V. FUTURE LITIGATION
The recent change in the level of Devils Lake has caused it to become
more valuable in terms of recreation; therefore, it is likely that future litiga-
tion will ensue even though the Tribe itself is barred from taking such ac-
tion on its own. 186 By holding that the Tribe's claim to the lakebed is
barred by the statute of limitations of the QTA, the court set aside the real
issue of this ongoing controversy, which is whether the Spirit Lake Tribe or
North Dakota owns title to the bed of Devils Lake.187 The combination of
the federal government, the State of North Dakota, the Tribe, and other




182. Id. at 750.
183. Id. at 750-51.
184. Id. at 751.
185. Id. at 745-46.
186. Id. at 746; see also Craig Bihrle, Deciphering Sovereign Lands, ND OUTDOORS, Sept.-
Oct. 2001, at 20.
187. Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 746 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
district court did not decide the real issue).
188. See Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D.N.D. 1989) (describing the three distinct
groups of defendants: North Dakota, the United States, and the riparian landowners).
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A. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES BRINGING SUIT ON
BEHALF OF THE TRIBE
As a trustee for the Spirit Lake Tribe, the United States government has
a general duty to protect tribal lands.189 Indeed, the failure of the govern-
ment to protect the land interests of the Native American has been "the
principal cause of the present plight of the average Indian." 190 One problem
that arises with the trust relationship between the Native Americans and the
United States government is the conflict of interest that faces the govern-
ment because of its representative duty to the general public.191 However,
"[w]here tribal and public interests ... collide, the Department [of the Inte-
rior] is nonetheless obligated to act on behalf of the tribe[]."192 Therefore,
even though the United States government has been an adverse party to the
Tribe in the Devils Lake controversy, it may still be obligated to represent
the Tribe. 193
Despite the questionable nature of the trust doctrine, the Supreme
Court held that a tribe could not be barred from bringing a lawsuit regarding
tribal lands just because the United States government also had the power to
bring the suit. 194 Under the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887,195 the
United States was to hold land from the reservation on behalf of individuals
in trust for a twenty-five year period to protect Indian land.196 However, the
government's status as trustee for a tribe does not prevent an individual
tribe member from protecting the property on his own through court ac-
tion. 197 Several courts have recognized the rights of tribes to bring actions
regarding their land; however, the United States government would not be
189. Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and
Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 330 (1995).
190. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 221 (1983) (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 11730
(1934) (statement of Rep. Howard)). There are three types of trust relationships between the
United States government and the Indian tribes. Id. The first type of trust relationship, which is a
statement that the government owes a general fiduciary duty to the tribe and represents the histori-
cal obligation of the federal government to protect tribal lands, is known as the "general trust." Id.
at 224-25. The second type, the "limited trust," is a trust relationship created by statute. Id. at
210-11. This type of trust does not give rise to fiduciary duties that are remediable. Id. The third
type of trust relationship, the "full trust," results in the complete management of tribal assets by
the United States government. Id. at 217-19.
191. Royster, supra note 189, at 342.
192. Id.
193. See id.; Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001).
194. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 373-75 (1968).
195. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (2000) (§§ 331-332 repealed 2000).
196. Poafpybitty, 390 U.S. at 368-69.
197. Id. at 369.
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bound by such an action unless it was a party to the action. 198 This princi-
ple has also been applied to tribal reservations held in trust by the United
States in general. 99
In Idaho III, the United States initiated an action on behalf of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe against the State of Idaho to quiet title of the bed of Lake
Coeur d'Alene.200 In Spirit Lake Tribe, the Tribe brought the quiet title ac-
tion.201 Because the decision was entered against the Tribe alone, the
United States government has the option of bringing a suit against North
Dakota as a trustee for the Tribe.202 Additionally, the government may not
be within the restraints of the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations be-
cause, according to Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and
School Lands,203 statutes of limitations are not applicable to sovereigns un-
less it is explicitly stated in the statute.204 However, it may be argued that
because the QTA waives sovereign immunity, which is normally done by
Congress, it should be strictly construed.205 According to the language of
the Act, the statute of limitations is applicable to any civil suit.206 There-
fore, if the Act is strictly construed, the statute of limitations would also ap-
ply to the federal government.2 07
In summary, the United States has the ability and perhaps the duty as
trustee to bring a suit to quiet title of the Devils Lake bed against the State
of North Dakota on behalf of the Spirit Lake Tribe.2 08 However, if the
court strictly construes the QTA to apply the twelve-year statute of limita-
tions to the United States government, the Spirit Lake Tribe would have no
remedy.2 09
198. Sadler v. Public Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 172 F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1949).
199. See Idaho 111, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,
614 (1983) (stating that water rights claims are brought by the United States for tribes).
200. Idaho 111, 533 U.S. at 271.
201. Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2001).
202. See Idaho 111, 533 U.S. at 271-72.
203. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
204. Block, 461 U.S. at 279.
205. Id. at 287.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (2000).
207. See Block, 461 U.S. at 287 (stating that the statutory language of the Act makes no ex-
ceptions for states).
208. Idaho 1, 533 U.S. 262, 271-72 (2001); see also Royster, supra note 189, at 342.
209. Block, 461 U.S. at 287.
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B. OUTCOME OF FUTURE LITIGATION: WHO WILL OWN TITLE TO
THE BED OF DEVILS LAKE?
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation, the United States will retain
a "navigational easement" in the bed of Devils Lake. 210 Although lands un-
der navigable waters generally pass to a state upon entry into statehood,
they are still subject to the "paramount power of the United States to control
such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign com-
merce." 211 Additionally, if the Tribe would receive quiet title to the bed of
Devils Lake, it would not have the authority to regulate the activities of
non-Indians unless given that power by Congress. 2 12 According to Mon-
tana v. United States, ownership of a lakebed merely gives a tribe power to
regulate, not prohibit, activities by non-Indians. 2 13 However, a tribe will
never have the power to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reser-
vation land owned by non-Indians, regardless of whether it owns title to the
lakebed.214
Although it is clear that the United States may bring a lawsuit against
the State of North Dakota on behalf of the Spirit Lake Tribe, the outcome,
should such a case arise, is less certain.2 15 The decision in a case brought
by the government would rest solely on the question of whether Congress
intended to reserve the bed of Devils Lake for the Spirit Lake Tribe, thereby
preventing title from passing to North Dakota upon its entry into the United
States of America. 216
As discussed earlier, in order to answer this question, it must be deter-
mined if the reservation passes the test set forth in Utah Division of State
Lands.217 The issue is whether Congress intended to reserve the bed of
Devils Lake for the Spirit Lake Tribe. 218 The first prong of the test is that
Congress must have clearly intended to include the lands beneath navigable
210. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555 (1981). Regardless of who owns the
lakebed, the United States retains access for use by the public. Id.
211. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
212. Montana, 450 U.S. at 550. Only a treaty or act of Congress can give a tribe the ability
to regulate hunting or fishing by non-Indians. Id.
213. Id. at 557 (stating that ownership of the lakebed would only allow the Tribe to regulate
hunting and fishing).
214. Id.
215. See Idaho 111, 533 U.S. 262, 280-81 (2001).
216. Id. (holding that Congress intended to refrain from passing the bed of Lake Coeur
d'Alene to Idaho at the time it entered the Union).
217. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 202 (1987). See supra text
accompanying notes 43-49.
218. See Idaho 111, 533 U.S. at 279-81.
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waters within the reservation. 2 19 The definition of "intent" varies between
jurisdictions.220 The court in United States v. Aranson221 construed the de-
cision in Montana to consider the dependence of a tribe upon the body of
water as an inference of intent.222 The Devils Lake reservation was estab-
lished in order to reward the Spirit Lake Tribe (Tribe) for its loyalty to the
United States government during the Sioux Uprising of 1862.223 Therefore,
the Tribe could argue that since the reservation was awarded to it, the gov-
ernment intended to include Devils Lake in the reservation because the res-
ervation abuts the lake.224
The Supreme Court of Alaska has held that "intent to include sub-
merged lands within a withdrawal may be inferred from the purpose and
language of a withdrawal." 225 In other words, intent to include submerged
land within a treaty is discerned by analyzing the actual language that set
aside the land.2 26 The Spirit Lake Tribe argued that because the description
of the reservation can be read as bordering on the shore of Devils Lake, in-
tent can be inferred from the treaty's language. 227 The Supreme Court,
however, has held that even if Congress intended to include the lakebed in a
reservation of land, if that intention is not clearly expressed, it will not be
heeded.228 Therefore, unless the Tribe can prove that the intention was
clearly expressed, Devils Lake will not be included in the reservation.2 29
The second prong of the test is that Congress must have clearly meant
to defeat the future state's claim to the underlying land.2 30 However, even
if it is established that Congress did intend to include the lakebed in the res-
ervation, if the intention to defeat the future state's title to the lakebed was
not clearly expressed, the test is not met.23 1 In Devils Lake I, the Tribe "ar-
gue[d] that the 'thence along the waters' passage mean[t] that the boundary
219. Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 202.
220. Compare United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 1983); with Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981).
221. 696 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1983).
222. Aranson, 696 F.2d at 666.
223. See Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2001).
224. Id.; see also Aranson, 696 F.2d at 666.
225. James v. State, 950 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Alaska 1997).
226. See id. at 1139 (stating that because there was no reference to the lake in the with-
drawal, there was no intent to include it in the reservation).
227. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 736. The Tribe argued that the 1867 treaty included
Devils Lake in the reservation and that the United States held the lakebed in trust for the Tribe.
Id.
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follows the north side of Devils Lake." 232 Although the Attorney General
assumed that North Dakota acquired title to the bed of Devils Lake upon
entry into the Union, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion stat-
ing that Devils Lake was wholly within the boundaries of the Devils Lake
Tribe and that the lakebed was held in trust for the Tribe. 233 Therefore, be-
cause the Department of the Interior issued an opinion stating that the bed
of Devils Lake was included in the reservation, the government's intention
to defeat North Dakota's ownership of the lakebed may have been clearly
expressed. 234
In all respects, it appears that lands under navigable water are rarely as-
sumed to be included in tribal reservations. 235 In United States v. Holt State
Bank,236 the Court held that the lakebed was not included in the reservation
because the land was merely reserved in a general way for the Indians so
that they could continue to live on their aboriginal lands. 237 "The mere fact
that the bed of a navigable water lies within the boundaries described in the
treaty does not make [it] part of the conveyed land, especially when there is
no express reference ... that might overcome the presumption against its
conveyance." 238 Therefore, a question that would have to be decided in
future litigation is whether the wording of the treaty clearly expressed an
intent to include the lakebed in the reservation. 239
VI. CONCLUSION
In his dissent, Judge Bright stated that the majority's decision in Spirit
Lake Tribe was "based on conjecture and ambiguity rather than on the mer-
its."240 He stated that the Tribe did not have an opportunity to fairly litigate
its claim. 241 Although the Tribe's claim was time-barred, there still is an
opportunity for the Tribe to prevail as the owner of the bed of Devils
Lake.2
42
232. Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D.N.D. 1989).
233. Devils Lake 11, 917 F.2d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 1990).
234. Id.; see also Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 208 (1987).
235. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 58 (1926). It is an established policy to
hold lands for the benefit of future states, and only an express reservation of the lakebed for an-
other purpose will supercede the rights of the states. Id. at 55.
236. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
237. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58.
238. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554 (1981).
239. Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 208.






As it was pointed out in Spirit Lake Tribe, the status of Devils Lake has
recently become even more controversial because the lake has expanded
and taken over "whole towns, farms, and roads producing breathtaking re-
sults." 243 Because of the fifteen-year time period that these lawsuits have
covered, and the amount of time and energy the Tribe has put into the ac-
quisition of the lakebed, it is unlikely that it will give up.244 Considering
that the United States has the opportunity to bring another lawsuit against
North Dakota on behalf of the Tribe, more litigation on this issue is
likely. 245
However, the possibility of future litigation does not guarantee the
Tribe's success.246 Although Devils Lake may be a physical part of the res-
ervation, it was not necessarily included in the reservation. 247 Unless the
Tribe has enough evidence clearly expressing the federal government's in-
tent to include the lakebed within the reservation, the lakebed will be con-
sidered part of the lands given to North Dakota under the "equal footing"
doctrine. 248
Emilee 0. Harren*
243. Id. at 735.
244. See Devils Lake 1, 714 F. Supp. 1019, 1025-26 (D.N.D. 1989); see also Devils Lake II,
917 F.2d 1049, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1990); Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 748.
245. Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 748 (Bright, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 750.
247. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 202 (1987) (stating that
because there was not enough evidence to establish intent, Congress could not defeat the state's
title to navigable waters).
248. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981) (stating that without express
language, the presumption that the sovereign conveyed the riverbed to the state stands).
* Special thanks to Professor James Grijalva at the University of North Dakota School of
Law for sharing his wealth of knowledge on tribal issues.
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